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Bilingualism: The foreign language effect 
does not extend to rational decision making
This research investigated if  the foreign language effect extended to rationality. 
Four groups (English speaking monolingual group; Polish speaking monolingual 
group; Bilingual Polish group who were presented with decision task in English; 
Bilingual Polish group who were presented with decision task in Polish) completed 
a series of  decision scenarios. The results highlighted that: 1) bilingual individuals 
did not display more rationality in general (or in specific decision scenarios); 2) the 
presentation of  a decision in a non-native language did not aid rational decision 
making in bilinguals. The paper suggests that the foreign language effect may not 
increase the chances of  bilingual individuals being more rational decision makers 
in general, but may promote more rational behaviour in specific decision contexts.
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Background context
 On review of  the literature, previous researchers have stated 
that bilingualism is difficult to define in detail, but most seem 
to agree that it is the knowledge and use of  two languages (e.g., 
Bialystok, 2010). Bilingualism is a rare ability in the United 
Kingdom as 95% of  British citizens can only speak English and 
are therefore monolinguals (BBC, 2014). Other estimates have 
suggested that only 7.7% of  people in England and Wales can 
speak another language in addition to English (Office for National 
Statistics, 2011). Despite these low numbers of  bilingualism in 
Britain, cognitive psychologists have suggested that bilinguals have 
cognitive advantages over monolinguals (Bialystok, 1999; Chung-
Fat-Yim, Sorge, & Bialystok, 2017). Decision making is one 
particular cognitive ability that has applied aspects to everyday life 
(e.g., what should I have for dinner?), professional life (e.g., what 
job should I apply for?) and society (e.g., should Britain stay in 
Europe?). Despite the importance of  such a cognitive ability, the 
study of  how bilingualism affects decision making is a relatively 
new area of  enquiry, with little research existing in the literature. 
The current research, therefore, aims to investigate if  there is a 
bilingual cognitive advantage in the domain of  decision making, 
as measured by increased rationality. 
Decision making
  Decision science is an interdisciplinary investigation centred 
on how people make decisions, the cognitive biases that hinder 
or help decision making, and how individuals evaluate risk 
(Curley, Murray, & MacLean, 2015; Curley, MacLean, Murray, 
& Laybourn, 2018). The most widely accepted model of  decision 
making is the dual process model (Kahneman, 2003). This model 
states that there are two systems for decision making, system one 
and system two. System one is an evolutionary old system (Evans, 
2008), which is intuitive, fast, sometimes biased, and automatic 
(Kahneman, 2003). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) studied a 
number of  heuristics and cognitive fallacies (deviations in human 
judgement from rational norms) that fall under the broad category 
of  system one. The three most well-known heuristics they studied 
were the representativeness heuristic; the availability heuristic; 
and the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. 
 First, when the representative heuristic is being utilised, 
decision makers ignore base rate information and use stereotypical 
information to make a decision (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 
1974). The usage of  this heuristic has been shown to lead to a 
number of  fallacies and biases (distortions from objective reality), 
such as: base rate neglect (ignorance of  base rate information); 
conjunction fallacy (when specific events are seen as more 
likely to occur than more general events); the gamblers fallacy 
(misconception of  chance being self-correcting); insensitivity to 
small samples (ignorance of  the sample size when evaluating the 
chances of  receiving a sample statistic); and, the inverse fallacy 
(e.g., inferring the probability of  the evidence being correct equates 
with the probability of  the hypothesis being correct e.g., Guthrie, 
Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 1983).
 Second, the availability heuristic leads to decision makers using 
the information most salient in their minds to make decisions, and 
information that is less salient, and potentially more valid, is not 
considered (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Third, the anchoring 
and adjustment heuristic causes individuals to first utilise 
numerical starting points (anchors) in their decision process, and 
then adjust, often inefficiently, from these points. For example, in 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) classic experiment, participants 
were told that they would be asked to predict the percentage of  
African countries in the United Nations (UN). However, before 
they gave their response, they were shown a spinning wheel 
(numbered from 0 to 100). Unbeknown to the participants, the 
board was rigged to stop at 10 or 65; these rigged numbers were 
used as the numerical anchors. The participants who were shown 
a 10 gave a median estimate of  25%, whereas the group who were 
shown the numerical anchor of  65 provided a median estimate of  
45%. This research showed that decision makers commonly use 
numerical anchors as a starting point when making a decision, and 
then adjust, often inefficiently, thus leading to a biased judgement/
prediction being reached (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
 In addition to heuristics, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) 
work extends to the study of  cognitive fallacies. For example, 
they investigated framing effects, where decision makers have 
been shown to choose different outcomes depending on how the 
decision is presented (positive vs. negative), despite the fact that 
the same information is presented for the decision regardless of  
the decision frame (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Furthermore, a 
number of  different intuitive responses can fall under the category 
of  system one reasoning (Kahneman, 2003). System one reasoning 
can lead to accurate decision making in simple and well-rehearsed 
decisions, but can lead to error in more complex decision scenarios 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
 System two on the other hand is slow, rational, and effortful 
(Kahneman, 2003). Despite being effortful, system two processes 
can be promoted in a number of  ways. For instance, decision 
makers were shown to be less likely to be affected by framing effects 
when they were asked to “think like a scientist” (Thomas & Miller, 
2012, p.143). Further, a number of  pieces of  research have shown 
that factors such as experience, expertise, and motivation can lead 
to a reduction in the use of  heuristics (Chan & Wang, 2014; Zhang, 
Zhai, Cheung, & Lee, 2014). A recent paper by Costa et al. (2019) 
suggested that another method of  increasing rationality was for 
decision makers to make decisions in a language that differed from 
their native language; this will be discussed further in the following 
section.
Does bilingualism promote rational decision making?
 Building on the idea that bilinguals differ from their 
monolingual counterparts in performance on many cognitive 
tasks, it has been proposed that their decision making processes 
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may also differ. Previous research has indicated that language 
context is essential for our understanding of  how people facing 
a decision evaluate the options presented. Many studies thus far 
found that decisions made in a foreign language, as compared to 
those made in native language, are more rational; this is known as 
the foreign language effect (Bilous, 2013; Costa, Foucart, Arnon, 
Aparici, & Apesteguia, 2014; Keysar, Hayakawa, & An, 2012; 
Costa et al., 2019; Hayakawa, Costa, Foucart, & Keysar, 2016).
 Further, Keysar et al. (2012) studied the effects of  bilingualism 
on a framing task. In a framing task, when the decision is framed in 
terms of  gains, participants typically display risk aversion (taking 
the decision that minimises risk). Conversely, when the decision is 
framed in terms of  losses, people are more likely to display risk-
taking behaviour (maximising risk). Keysar et al. (2012) found that 
when participants took part in framing tasks in a second language, 
as opposed to their first language, their risk aversion and risk-
taking behaviours were reduced. The researchers concluded that 
when conducting a decision-making task in a second language, 
participants utilised system two (rational thinking), whereas when 
the decision was performed in their primary language, system 
one was employed (intuitive thinking). Confirmatory evidence for 
their explanation comes from Bilous (2013) who also found that 
when bilinguals make decisions in a foreign language, they are 
more likely to be rational, and less likely to make risky decisions. 
Using a similar framing task to Keyser et al. (2012), Costa et al. 
(2014) found that participants who received the frame in their 
foreign language were still affected by the framing effect. However, 
they found that the framing effect was smaller in individuals in 
the foreign language condition in comparison those who were 
presented with the decision in their native language. Similar results 
were also found when they investigated the foreign language 
effect in an ambiguity aversion (biased towards known risks over 
unknown risks) task (Costa et al., 2014).
 Costa, Vives, and Corey (2017) extended previous research 
by showing that the processing of  a foreign language may cause 
decision makers to move their mode of  cognition from system one 
to system two, thus increasing their rationality. Their reasoning 
is that a foreign language is processed less automatically than a 
native language, which could also lead to a more deliberative 
mode of  thinking (i.e., the use of  system two; Costa et al., 2017). 
In addition, Costa et al. (2017) argued that bilingual decision 
makers are more likely to process information in an emotional 
manner in their native language in comparison to a foreign 
language, thus suggesting that this emotionality will trigger system 
one to govern reasoning when evaluating a decision in the native 
language (Pavlenko, 2005). Emotional responses, both subjective 
and physiological, to emotional expressions have been shown, 
previously, to decrease when stimuli is presented in a foreign 
language when compared to when stimuli is presented in a native 
language (e.g., Ayciceği & Harris, 2004; Dewaele, 2004; Harris, 
Aycicegi, & Gleason, 2003; Puntoni, de Langhe, & van Osselaer, 
2009). Furthermore, it has been proposed that bilinguals, while 
making decisions in their second language, are more likely to use 
system two of  the dual process model (Kahneman, 2003).
 However, a number of  factors have been found to mediate 
the relationship between emotional processing and the mode of  
cognition used during decision making. For instance, Caldwell-
Harris (2014) argues that the context in which languages are learnt 
and used may influence the emotional reaction that specific words 
may trigger. Therefore, factors such as the age of  inquisition and 
proficiency levels of  a second language may influence the mode 
of  cognition utilised by the decision maker (Caldwell-Harris, 
2014; Dewaele, 2010). Individuals who learnt a language earlier 
in life and/or who are highly proficient in a language, may be 
more likely to processes the language in an emotional manner 
(Caldwell-Harris, 2014; Dewaele, 2010). For example, the 
phrase “mein hamster ist gestorben” means my hamster is dead 
in German. If  you are a native English speaker and learnt that 
phrase whilst living in Germany as a child from a sad friend of  
yours, you may associate the phrase with sadness. If, however, 
you learnt the phrase in your thirties on a language learning app, 
it may not have the same emotional resonance. Therefore, the 
association between mode of  cognition and bilingualism may be 
moderated by the context in which a second language is used and 
learnt (Caldwell-Harris, 2014; Dewaele, 2010). 
 Nevertheless, the dual process model may explain the foreign 
language effect, as the way the information is presented (i.e., 
foreign vs. native language) may have an influence on the mode 
of  cognition that governs the decision maker. For instance, when 
decisions are presented in the decision makers’ native language, 
decision makers may process the language easily and thus make 
an intuitive decision (Costa et al., 2017). Whereas, when decisions 
are presented in a foreign language, the decision maker may need 
to think about the language of  the decision and may also have less 
of  an emotional response, thus increasing the chances of  system 
two being utilised during the decision process (Costa et al., 2017).
 The occurrence of  the foreign language effect seems to depend 
on the type of  decision scenario, however. Costa et al. (2014) 
showed that in an experiment using the ticket/money loss scenario, 
all participants were equally affected by the framing manipulation 
regardless of  the language the problem was presented in. In this 
scenario, participants are told either that a woman has lost tickets 
to a show, or that the woman has lost the money equivalent to 
buying a ticket to a show, then participants are asked if  the woman 
should buy more tickets. Previous research has shown that decision 
makers are more likely to state that the woman would buy more 
tickets when she has lost money in comparison to when she has 
lost tickets. This is because the loss of  the money is not accounted 
for in relation to the total amount spent on the tickets, whereas 
when tickets are lost, the amount spent on the lost and potential 
tickets is combined to form an overall ticket expenditure (Costa 
et al., 2014). A similar framing task (the Discount task), however, 
yielded different results that were in line with the foreign language 
effect. In the discount task, decision makers are shown scenarios 
relating to the discount of  items, and it is commonly found that 
individuals are not persuaded by the amount of  the discount but 
rather the proportion of  the discount on the overall item (Costa et 
al., 2014).
 The authors, tentatively, explained that the ticket/money 
task was the only task that did not ask the participant to imagine 
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that they are the actor of  the scenario. Rather it presented a 
hypothetical person as the actor and participants had to put 
themselves into this person’s shoes, which could have affected the 
level of  emotional involvement. Further, these results suggest that 
the emergence of  the foreign language effect may be decision 
context dependent.
 Previous research, however, has been confined to investigating 
the foreign language effect in specific decision scenarios, testing only 
one type of  heuristic or cognitive fallacy at a time. This research is 
limited and cannot generalise the foreign language effect beyond 
the specific heuristic or cognitive fallacy of  interest. System one 
consists of  a plethora of  non-rational strategies (Kahneman, 
2011), and the attenuation of  one type of  bias or fallacy because 
of  the foreign language effect does not suggest the attenuation 
of  all of  system one. Further, Gigerenzer (1991) and Simon 
(1956) suggested that we have a plethora of  heuristics adapted to 
multiple environments. Therefore, when studying the influence 
of  a decision being presented in a foreign language on the mode 
of  cognition, multiple decision scenarios (each associated with 
the promotion of  a particular heuristic/fallacy) should be tested. 
Current Research and hypothesis
 The current research therefore has two main aims. First, 
the current research hopes to extend on the work of  previous 
research by investigating the influence that the foreign language 
effect has on the usage of  heuristics and the likelihood of  falling 
into a fallacy trap. In addition, the research hopes to explain the 
foreign language effect through the use of  dual process model of  
decision making, highlighting that decisions presented in a foreign 
language are more likely to promote system two (or rational) 
reasoning. Second, the research aims to test if  the foreign language 
effect can be extended to rationality more generally, by presenting 
participants with a number of  decision scenarios that have been 
utilised in previous research when testing different heuristics and 
fallacies (availability heuristic, the representativeness heuristics, 
framing effects, etc.). The reasoning for this is because most of  
the previous research has investigated the effects of  the foreign 
language effect on the usage of  specific heuristics and fallacies, 
rather than on the effects it has on the more general mode of  
cognition (system one versus system two). These aims informed 
the following hypothesis:
 Bilinguals (from Poland) presented with decisions in a foreign 
language (English) will be significantly more rational than the other 
three groups (i.e., English speaking monolingual’s shown decisions 
in English; Polish monolinguals shown decisions in Polish; and, 
Polish bilinguals shown decisions in Polish).
Method
Design
 A 2 × 2 between subjects design was used. The first factor was 
language ability (monolingual vs. bilingual) and the second factor 
was language presentation (English vs. Polish). The dependent 
measure was called rationality and was measured by the number 
of  rational decisions made by the participants over a series of  eight 
questions: minimum = 0; maximum = 8. Analyses of  the influence 
of  the foreign language effect on the usage of  specific heuristics/
fallacies took the form of  tests of  associations with binary variables 
(‘0’ score for a biased decision and ‘1’ for a rational decision).
 
Participants
 In 2017, it was estimated that 889,000 Polish individuals stayed 
in the United Kingdom (UK), meaning that Polish individuals are 
the biggest non-British group currently residing in the UK (Blake, 
2018). Native English speakers and Polish participants were 
therefore the focus for this study. 
 Altogether, 140 participants took part in the study, 70 in the 
English monolingual group, 21 in the Polish monolingual group, 
and 49 in the Polish/English bilingual group. Of  the bilingual 
group, 26 completed the study in their native language (Polish), 
and 23 completed the study in their foreign language (English). 
 There were 44 males, 95 females, and one participant did not 
state their gender. The mean age of  the sample was 29.40 years 
(SD = 9.44 years). There was a variety of  education levels within 
the sample and across both groups, ranging from compulsory 
schooling only, to PhD level. The English-speaking monolingual 
group had lived in the UK for a mean of  25.79 years (SD = 11.28 
years). Of  the 49 members of  the bilingual group, 38 (77.6%) lived 
in the UK, with a mean duration of  8.74 years (SD = 5.67 years). 
All Polish monolingual participants lived in Poland at the time of  
testing and never before had lived in an English-speaking country. 
Of  the English monolingual group, 65 (71.4%) have studied at a 
UK university, and 29 (59.2%) of  the bilingual group have studied 
at a UK university.
 Participants were recruited through the Edinburgh Napier 
University Psychology Participant Pool, advertisements on social 
media sites, and through posters displayed on university campuses. 
The inclusion criteria were that participants should either speak 
only English, only Polish, or be fluent in both English and Polish 
only (i.e., no further languages). Participants were also required 
to be 18 years of  age or over and have access to the internet to 
complete the study online. 
Materials
Language categorisation.
 Materials were created in both the English language and the 
Polish language, with the English documents being translated 
by author BP, whose native language is Polish and is as fluent in 
English as a native speaker. The translations were cross-checked 
by an independent Polish-English bilingual speaker.
 All materials were presented using the online survey platform 
Qualtrics. The first question asked participants if  they fluently 
spoke English only, Polish only, or if  they could speak both 
languages fluently (each option was presented in English and Polish, 
so participants had the context of  the other options). From this 
point on, the English monolingual participants only saw materials 
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written in English, the Polish monolingual participants only saw 
materials in Polish, with the Polish/English bilingual participants 
seeing either English or Polish only, with an alternating algorithm 
directing participants accordingly.
Ethical materials and demographics questionnaire.
 The information form contained details of  the study, the 
participants’ rights, and a reminder of  the inclusion criteria. The 
consent form required confirmation that the participant had read 
and understood the information sheet, and were freely willing to 
take part in the study. A demographics questionnaire contained 16 
items in relation to the participant’s gender, age, education level, 
country of  residence, and location of  higher education institution 
(where appropriate). These questions were asked to help situate the 
sample tested, and to make assertions about the level of  English 
participants may have been educated in. Finally, the debrief  form 
contained further information about the study, with the option for 
participants to submit their final answers.
Need for cognition scale.
 Participants then completed the Need for Cognition scale 
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). This measure was included in 
this study to determine if  thinking style/preference (analytical 
or not) is related to decision-making style (rational or bias), or if  
it at least acts as an explanatory co-variate in differences. This 
consists of  18 short statements about thinking and problem-
solving, which require the participant to select the answer that 
best suits their habits on a nine-point scale from ‘very strong 
agreement’ (scored +4) through to ‘very strong disagreement’ 
(scored –4), with ‘neither agreement nor disagreement (scored 0) 
as the middle option. Example statements include ‘I would prefer 
complex to simple problems’ and ‘thinking is not my idea of  
fun’ (reversed scoring). Those who score highly on this measure 
are more likely than low scorers to frequently enjoy and engage 
in thought elaboration and deliberation. They also have more 
confidence in their thoughts and arguments (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982). A Cronbach’s Alpha, however, indicated that the Need for 
Cognition scale had a low internal consistency (α =.340) when 
the current data set was being utilised. Such a low reliability of  
the scale in the current sample is in line with previous research 
showing similar levels in heterogenous samples of  participants 
from different socio-economic and educational backgrounds 
(Shepperd, Emanuel, Dodd & Logan, 2016) but in contrast with 
those studies using student samples (Caccioppo, Petty, Kao, 1984; 
Sadowski & Gulgoz, 1992). As the reliability of  this measure was 
so poor, it was excluded from further analysis. 
 Decision making task and scoring. The decision making 
task was an adaptation of  the influential research by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1983), modernised by the researchers. Eight short 
statements were presented one at a time, followed by two to four 
answer options, from which the participant chose one. The answer 
selected indicates if  the participant made a rational or biased 
decision. An example statement used is ‘Alex has an analytical 
mind, and is good in debates with excellent communication skills. 
Is Alex more likely to be a lawyer or a nurse?’. This question tests 
the representativeness heuristic. Given that there are around 
five to six times more nurses than there are lawyers both in the 
UK and Poland, the correct answer here would be that Alex is 
more likely a nurse. However, given the specific description of  
Alex, participants may more easily associate their skills with that 
of  a lawyer than that of  a nurse. This would also show that the 
participant had disregarded baseline population statistics and had 
instead equated the representation of  the character description 
with a higher probability of  practicing law. Participants received 
one point on the dependent variable of  ‘rationality’ if  they selected 
‘nurse’ as their answer, and zero points if  they selected ‘lawyer’. 
 Another example statement measures the availability heuristic 
(hereafter called availability heuristic 1). The question asks ‘You 
go on holiday to the United States of  America, what are you 
most likely to die from, a firearm or pneumonia?’. Given the 
media coverage of  firearm crimes in the USA, there is likely 
more information on that available to the participant, leading 
them to select this as their answer. However, on average, there 
are over 57,000 cases of  deaths by pneumonia reported annually, 
as opposed to just over 15,000 deaths by firearm. The participant 
would receive one point on the rationality scale for selecting the 
answer of  ‘pneumonia’, and zero points for selecting ‘firearm’.
 The remaining six items on the decision making task were 
similar in nature, each testing a different heuristic/fallacy as 
follows: framing effect question (risk averse); inverse fallacy; a 
second availability heuristic (availability heuristic 2); conjunction 
fallacy; base rate neglect, and gambler’s fallacy; all with appropriate 
answer options. Each participant could have a total score between 
zero and eight, with the higher scores indicating more rational 
decision making.
	 Self-reported	language	proficiency	test. The self-
report language proficiency test was provided to the bilingual 
participants only. It consisted of  nine items adapted from the 
Language and Social Background Questionnaire (LSBQ) 
developed by Anderson, Mak, Keyvani Chahi, and Bialystok 
(2017). Two simple questions asked where the participant had 
learned English (e.g., home, school, community, etc.), and at 
what age they started actively using English. Two items required 
participants to select the quantity they speak, listen, read, 
and write in English, on a scale of  0 (no English, all Polish) to 
100 (all English, no Polish), both at home and at university/
work. Two questions asked participants to rate their speaking, 
understanding, reading, and writing skills in comparison to a 
native monolingual speaker, with 0 indicating non-native like, 
and 100 = native like. Bilingual participants were asked to 
complete this rating for both the Polish and English languages. 
Finally, three questions asked participants how frequently they 
switch between both languages when engaging with parents/
family, friends, and social media, on a five-point scale from 
never to always. This measure was used to allow comparisons of  
language ability and immersion, and also to allow the exclusion 
of  non-fluent bilingual participants from the sample. 
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Procedure 
 The materials were presented online using Qualtrics, and 
the link to the survey was electronically distributed. The survey 
therefore took place at a time and place that suited the participant, 
and on the device of  their choosing. When a participant engaged 
with an advertisement of  the study and clicked on the survey link, 
they were directed to the first question and had to select if  they 
spoke only English, only Polish, were fluent in English and Polish, 
or of  they spoke any other languages. Those who selected the final 
option were directed to a screen with text that thanked them for 
their interest and time but informed that they were ineligible to 
continue with the study. From this point on, English monolinguals 
were presented with English materials, Polish monolinguals 
were presented with Polish materials, and half  of  the bilingual 
participants saw the English materials, with the other half  seeing 
the Polish materials. 
 The information sheet was then displayed with the option to 
continue to the consent form. The consent form had two options, 
to take part, or not to take part, those selecting not to were thanked 
for their time and the study ended. Following the submission of  
consent, the demographic questions were displayed. Again, if  the 
monolingual speakers selected an option that indicated that they 
spoke another language, they were thanked and exited from the 
study. After the demographic questionnaire was completed, the 
Need for Cognition scale was presented, followed by the decision-
making task. The monolingual groups then submitted their 
answers after reading the debrief  form. The bilingual group were 
led to the self-rated language proficiency task before reading the 
debrief  form and submitting their data.
 The survey took approximately 15–20 minutes to complete. 
Only fully completed and submitted entries were analysed, with 
incomplete submissions deleted from the Qualtrics platform. 
 
The data were organised using Microsoft Excel and statistically 
analysed using SPSS 23.
 Ethical Approval: Ethical approval for the study was 
provided by the School of  Applied Sciences Research Integrity 
Committee at Edinburgh Napier University.
Results
Language proficiency
 In order to ensure that the two groups of  bilingual speakers, 
those who were presented with scenarios in their native language 
(Polish) and those who were presented with scenarios in their 
foreign language (English), did not differ in their language 
proficiency levels, an analysis of  difference was conducted. 
Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive and inferential statistics for the 
bilinguals’ proficiency levels and their use of  both languages in 
everyday activities, respectively.
 There are no significant differences in English language and 
Polish language proficiency between bilingual participants who 
were presented with decision in English comparing to those who 
were presented with decisions in Polish.
 Table 2 also shows that when it comes to the use of  language 
in everyday activities, there were no significant differences in 
activities carried out at work or university and in most of  those 
carried out at home. Also, the age at which participants started to 
actively use their second language was not significantly different. 
There was, however, a significant difference (p = .047) in speaking 
where bilinguals who were randomly assigned to make decisions 
in Polish, spoke Polish at home more than they spoke English. 
This difference can be seen as negligible in the context of  the 
remaining measures.
Note.
a Participants were asked to rate their proficiency level in a scale of  0–100 relative to a native speaker of  a given language.
b significance indicated for a t-test or non-parametric equivalent (Mann-Whitney U test) when required.  
* significant at p <.05; ns - non-significant.  
Table 1





In order to ensure that the two groups of bilingual speakers, those who were presented with 
scenarios in their native languag  (Polish) and those who were presented with scenarios in 
their foreign language (English), did not differ in their language proficiency levels, an analysis 
of difference was conducted. Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive and inferential statistics for 
the bilinguals’ proficiency levels and their use of both languages in everyday activities, 
respectively. 
Table 1  
Language proficiency indicators of t  ili l group (decisions presented in English vs. Polish). 
 
        English Proficiency  Polish Proficiency  
  
Decisions made in 
English 
M (SD) 
Decisions made in 
Polish 
M (SD) 
Sig.b Decisions made in 
English 
M (SD) 




Speakinga 76.52 (19.45) 67.60 (22.04) ns 95.22 (10.39)  96.25 (6.47) ns 
Comprehensiona 87.83 (11.26) 77.20 (20.31) ns 98.26 (3.88)  96.80 (6.90) ns 
Readinga 88.70 (12.54) 80.00 (19.36) ns 97.83 (5.18)  98.40 (3.74) ns 
Writinga 79.13 (21.09) 71.25 (21.53) ns 94.78 (13.10)  95.20 (9.18) ns 
 
Note: a Participants were asked to rate their proficiency level in a scale of 0-100 relative to a native speaker of a given language. b 





There are no significant differences in English language and Polish language proficiency 
between bilingual participants who were presented with decision in English comparing to 








Differences in rationality score between language ability and language 
presentation
 Descriptive statistics relating to rationality scores across each 
of  the two conditions of  the IVs: language ability (bilingual vs. 
monolingual) and language presentation (English vs. Polish), are 
presented in table 3. For rationality, the higher the score, the more 
rational the participant. 
 The data were non-parametric according to the Shapiro-
Wilk tests of  normality (all p <. 05). Due to the violation of  the 
assumption of  normality, a generalized linear model was used. 
The type of  model chosen was ordinal logistic as the data had a 
non-normal distribution and could be ordered from most rational 
(highest score was six) to least rational (biased: lowest score was 
zero).
 Initially, it was found that the model did not significantly 
outperform the null model [x2 (3) = 2.59, p = .46]. Each of  the 
main effects and interactions were then investigated. First, it was 
found that the language presentation factor had no significant 
effect on the rationality score [x2 (1) = .143, p = .71]. Second, it 
was found that the language ability factor did not have a significant 
effect on the rationality score [x2 (1) = .001, p = .97]. Third, it 
was found that the interaction between the language ability and 
language presentation factor did not have a significant effect on 
the rationality score [x2 (1) = 2.45, p = .12].
The foreign language effect on specific heuristics/fallacies
 To follow up the previous analysis, multiple tests were conducted 
to analyse if  the foreign language effect enhances rationality in 
specific decision scenarios commonly associated with promoting a 
heuristic/fallacy. As each question was analysed separately at this 
point, the measure of  rationality was expressed in binary form 
(rational choice versus biased choice). The aim was to test for 
association between this rationality score (zero = biased choice; 
Note. 
a Age from when participants started actively using their second language. 
b Participants were asked to indicate the proportion of  their use for English and Polish in daily life on a scale from 0 to 100 
where 0 indicates that a given activity is carried out in all Polish and 100 indicates activity being carried out in all English. 
c Participants were asked about how often they were switching between the two languages while communicating with 
family/friends or on social media on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 indicates ‘never’ and 5 indicates ‘always’
d significance indicated for a t-test or non-parametric equivalent (Mann-Whitney U test) when required. 
* significant at p <.05; ns - non-significant.  
Table 2. 







Language use in the bilingual group (decisions presented in English vs. Polish). 
 
  
Decisions made in 
English 
M (SD) 






Agea 17.04 (7.22) 18.96 (8.89) ns 
 
Speaking 61.00 (32.10) 40.00 (32.75) *  
Listening 60.91 (30.22) 51.67 (31.30) ns  
Reading 63.91 (23.30) 55.60 (31.63) ns  
Writing 66.36 (25.92) 60.00 (33.52) ns  
TV 75.45 (23.41) 66.09 (31.15) ns  
Activities at 
homeb 
Radio 77.23 (33.08) 76.84 (31.28) ns  
Speaking 88.64 (16.12) 82.08 (29.34) ns  
Listening 88.64 (17.81) 86.52 (24.79) ns  
Reading 95.45 (11.43) 86.80 (25.77) ns  
Activities at work 
and/or 
universityb 
Writing 94.10 (15.01) 87.92 (25.02) ns  
With parents and 
family 2.96 (1.11) 2.88 (1.10) ns  




On social media 2.43 (1.16) 2.40 (1.23) ns  
 
Note: a Age from when participants started actively using their second language. b 
Participants were asked to indicate the proportion of their use for English and Polish in 
daily life on a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 indicates that a given activity is carried out in all 
Polish and 100 indicates ac ivity being carried out in ll English. c Participants were asked 
about how often they were switching between the two languages while communicating 
with family/friends or on social media on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 indicates ‘never’ and 
5 indicates ‘always. d significance indicated for a t-test or non-parametric equivalent 
(Mann-Whitney U test) when required. * significant at p <.05; ns - non-significant. 
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one = rational choice) and language group (English speaking 
monolingual presented with decision in English; Polish bilingual 
presented with decision in English; Polish bilingual presented with 
decision in Polish; Polish monolingual presented with decision in 
Polish) in each of  the decision tasks (e.g. for each heuristic and 
fallacy). Analyses suitable for categorical data were therefore 
conducted. Table 4 presents associations between language 
group and rationality for each heuristic/fallacy. No significant 
associations were found.
Additional Analysis
 Additional analysis investigated if  there was a correlation 
between the numbers of  years lived in the UK for polish 
Bilinguals (Mdn = 10) and the rationality score (Mdn = 2); only 
bilingual individuals who answered yes to currently living in 
the UK were included in this analysis. Both scores were non-
parametric according to Shapiro-Wilk’s test of  normality (p < .01). 
A Spearman’s Rho correlation was conducted and found that no 
significant relationship existed [rs (30) = –.205; p = .14].
 
Discussion
 The aim of  this current study was to investigate whether the 
foreign language effect extends to rationality. The main hypothesis, 
therefore, was that bilinguals (from Poland) presented with 
decisions in a foreign language (English) would be significantly 
more rational than the other three groups (i.e., English speaking 
monolingual participants presented with decision-making tasks in 
English; Polish monolingual participants shown the tasks in Polish; 
Table 3.







Rationality scores across groups. 
  Rationality Score 
  
English monolingual Polish  monolingual 
Bilinguals completing 
tasks in English 
Bilinguals completing 
tasks in Polish 
Median 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.50 
Minimum 0.00  1.00 1.00 2.00 
Maximum 5.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 
Mean 2.67 2.43 2.39 2.81 
Std. Dev. 1.32 1.29 1.27 1.02 
 
The data were non-parametric according to the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality (all p <. 05). 
Due to the violation of the assumption of normality, a generalized linear model was used. The 
type of model chosen was ordinal logistic as the data had a non-normal distribution and could 
be ordered from most rational (highest score was six) to least rational (biased: lowest score was 
zero). 
 
Initially, it was found that the model did not significantly outperform the null model [x2 (3) = 
2.59, p = .46]. Each of the main effects and interactions were then investigated. First, it was 
found that the language presentation factor had no significant effect on the rationality score 
[x2 (1) = .143, p = .71]. Second, it was found that the language ability factor did not have a 
significant effect on the rationality score [x2 (1) = .001, p = .97]. Third, it was found that the 
interaction between the language ability and language presentation factor did not have a 
significant effect on the rationality score [x2 (1) = 2.45, p = .12]. 
Table 4. 
Associations between language group and rationality for each heuristic/fallacy








Associations between language group and rationality for each heuristic/fallacy 
Heuristic/Fallacy X² p ɸ 
Representativeness 4.51 a .20 .17 
Inverse fallacy 5.56 a .08 .22 
Framing (risk averse) 3.27 a .36 .16 
Gambler’s fallacy .70 a .93 .06 
Conjunction fallacy .78 b .85 .08 
Base rate neglect 2.47 b .48 .13 
Availability heuristic (1) 4.87 b .18 .19 
Availability heuristic (2)  3.56 b .31 .16 
 
Note: a Fisher-Freeman-Halton exact test conducted as 37.5% had an expected count below 5; bchi-square test. 
 
Additional Analysis 
Additional analysis investigated if there was a correlation between the numbers of years lived 
in t e UK for polish Bilinguals (Mdn = 10) and the rationality score (Mdn = 2); only bilingual 
individuals who answered yes to urrently living in the UK were included in this analysis. 
Both scores were non-parametric according to Shapiro-Wilk’s test of normality (p < .01). A 
Spearman’s Rho correlation was conducted and found that no significant relationship existed 
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to rationality. The main hypothesis, therefore, was that bilinguals (from Poland) presented 
with decisions in a foreign language (English) would be significantly more rational than the 
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and Polish bilingual participants shown the tasks in Polish). The 
results showed that these groups of  participants did not differ in 
their level of  rationality, thus leading to the null hypothesis being 
retained. 
 There are three main possible explanations that can be drawn 
from the results: 1) the Polish bilingual group may have integrated 
well in Britain and they no longer need to utilise system two to 
process the English language (cultural integration explanation); 2) 
the foreign language effect may not affect rationality when it is 
measured in a global manner (the global rationality explanation) 
and may be limited to attenuating the usage of  specific heuristics/
fallacies that were not investigated in the current study; or, 3) the 
foreign language effect does not extend to decision making at all 
(the lack of  influence explanation). Each of  these explanations is 
discussed below.
 The first possible explanation relates to the cognitive adaptation 
of  Polish immigrants and their integration into Britain. This 
explanation is based on the influential work by Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein (1996), where they propose that too much knowledge 
on a particular topic can have a negative effect on the ability of  
the decision maker to make accurate decisions. They tested this 
assumption by giving participants a series of  German city pairs, 
and asked them to choose which city had the most inhabitants. 
Participants with little prior knowledge of  the German cities were 
poor at choosing the city with the largest number of  inhabitants, 
and too much knowledge of  the German cities also led to poor 
performance. However, individuals who had a middling knowledge 
of  German cities gave the highest percentage of  correct answers 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). It was concluded that if  a decision 
maker has no knowledge of  either cities, they would have to guess 
which option to choose, and if  a decision maker recognises both 
decision outcomes (i.e., knows both cities), they may not be able to 
decipher the option that is most likely to have the highest number 
of  inhabitants. Whereas, knowledge of  one of  the cities (Berlin) but 
not the other city (Bonn) will allow the decision maker to choose 
the recognised city over the non-recognised city, thus allowing the 
decision maker to choose the correct option. This counterintuitive 
less or more method of  decision making works because recognised 
cities may be known for having a larger population (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996).
 Further, Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s (1996) work on this more 
is less effect may explain why the foreign language effect may not 
have influenced rationality in the current study. For instance, the 
median number of  years that Polish bilinguals had lived in the 
UK was 10, during this time they may have become accustomed 
to the English language and no longer had difficulty or delays in 
processing the English language. Therefore, the Polish bilingual 
group tested in the current study may have processed the English 
language in a similar manner to English speaking monolinguals 
and may also have processed the Polish language similarly to 
Polish monolinguals. Consequently, meaning that bilinguals in 
the current study were as likely to use intuitive decision making 
processes as monolinguals in each of  the respective languages. 
 The results of  this study, however, suggest that there was no 
significant association between the amount of  years spent in 
the UK and rationality score, thus highlighting that the cultural 
integration explanation may not be adequate enough to explain 
the lack of  significance in the current study.
 In relation to the second explanation, when comparing the 
current study that investigated rationality in a general manner 
(through a number of  decision scenarios that promoted intuitive 
reasoning) with previous research that has been centered on 
how the foreign language effect may influence specific cognitive 
fallacies, it can be suggested that the foreign language effect may 
not generalise to rationality when it has been measured in a more 
global way. In other words, making a decision in a foreign language 
may decrease the chances of  a decision maker being influenced 
by framing effects (Costa et al., 2014), but will not increase the 
chances of  them be rational in every decision context. 
 Previous research from Costa et al. (2014) lends support to this 
explanation. For instance, it was found that the foreign language 
effect led to a decrease of  framing effects in their discount task, but 
did not lead to more rationality in their ticket/money loss scenario. 
Further, the foreign language effect did not influence rationality 
in the framing task utilised in this study (a different framing task 
from the Costa et al. (2014 study), once again highlighting that 
the foreign language effect may not influence rationality in every 
decision scenario. In summary, the current study lends support 
to the idea that the foreign language effect does not influence 
our chances of  displaying rational behaviour in every decision 
context, and that the influence that the foreign language effect 
may have on our rationality may be decision context dependent; 
the current study may have just not used decision contexts that 
positively (i.e., promote rational decision making) interact with the 
foreign language effect. Nevertheless, future research is needed 
to test the claim that rationality can be influenced by the foreign 
language effect in specific decision contexts. This is because the 
current study failed to show that the foreign language effect can 
attenuate the chances of  decision makers utilising heuristics/
fallacies in specific decision scenarios.
 Our final explanation of  the findings is that the foreign 
language effect does not extend to the area of  decision making at 
all. Further, when it comes to previous research on bilingualism 
and decision making, indeed, bilinguals seemed to show differences 
when studying specific decision scenarios that promoted particular 
heuristics and/or cognitive fallacies (Bilous, 2013; Costa et al., 
2014; Costa et al., 2017; Hayakawa et al., 2016; Keysar et al., 
2012). These results, however, have not been confirmed by the 
current investigation and we therefore call for more research in the 
area in order to be able to comment, with confidence, on how the 
foreign language effect influences rationality.
 Based on the analyses in the current study, therefore, the global 
rationality explanation and lack of  influence explanation may be 
the best contenders for explaining the relationship between the 
foreign language effect and rationality. However, when taking 
these results in context with the wider literature, it seems that the 
global rationality explanation may provide the most promise. This 
is because the current study found that the foreign language effect 
did not attenuate the usage of  specific heuristics/fallacies, whereas 
previous research has shown that the foreign language effect can 
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attenuate the usage of  particular heuristics and cognitive fallacies 
(Bilous, 2013; Costa et al., 2014; Costa et al., 2017; Hayakawa 
et al., 2016; Keysar et al., 2012). Nevertheless, more research 
is needed to decipher which of  these explanations (the global 
rationality explanation vs. the lack of  influence explanation) best 
describes the relationship that the foreign language effect has on 
rationality.
Limitations and suggestions for further research
 There are limitations in the current study that need to be 
considered. The study did not evaluate an actual language 
proficiency level of  the participants; only a self-reported fluency 
level was obtained. Also, the language use of  monolingual 
speakers was not assessed. This approach was used as it is in 
line with previous literature on bilingualism (e.g., Elston-Güttler, 
Paulmann & Kotz, 2005; Gollan & Acenas, 2004; Gollan & 
Silverberg, 2001). Future research, however, should measure 
proficiency levels using established English proficiency tests and/
or test how well the participants understand the decision scenarios 
used (such measures were previously used by Costa et al., 2014). 
Inclusion of  both of  these measures in further studies would 
also allow a more in-depth investigation of  how different levels 
of  proficiency may impact rational thinking. A more complex, 
exploratory, and correlational, rather than differential, analyses 
in future research would be particularly interesting as it has been 
previously suggested that bilingualism should not be considered as 
a categorical variable but as a multi-dimensional experience (Luk 
& Bialystok, 2013).
Conclusion
 In conclusion, of  the three possible explanations for these 
findings, there is two plausible account for the current results: 1) 
the foreign language effect may not affect rationality when it is 
measured in a global manner (the global rationality explanation) 
and may be limited to attenuating the usage of  specific heuristics/
fallacies that were not investigated in the current study 2) the foreign 
language effect does not extend to rationality. Additional analyses 
found: 1) that the foreign language effect did not attenuate the use 
of  the specific heuristics/fallacies used in the current study; 2) that 
the number of  years bilingual individuals have lived in the UK 
does not correlate with rational decision making. Nevertheless, 
future research is needed to confirm which explanation (the global 
rationality explanation vs. the lack of  influence explanation) best 
describes the relationship between the foreign language effect and 
rationality. The current piece of  research has been insightful in 
placing potential parameters in the foreign language effect (i.e., 
that the foreign language effect may be context dependent) and 
has generated potential hypotheses/explanations for the academic 
community to study further. 
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